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Abstract — Potential effectiveness of cyber-attacks against 
utility networks using protocol DNP3 would increase rapidly, 
when DNP3 is employed over TCP/IP, because attacks succeed on 
the Internet can be used against DNP3. This becomes a critical 
concern for DNP3 since an outstation may be accessed from 
multiple masters of external networks. However, commercial 
Internet security does not provide applicable security since they 
were not designed specifically for DNP3. This paper proposes a 
new efficient cyber-security specifically designed for DNP3 at its 
interface with TCP/IP to augment utility commercial security 
capability. Rule-based security is implemented for the proposed 
cyber-security for DNP3 over TCP/IP using the function codes, 
data objects, and data sets from DNP3 data link layer and 
application layer. The rule-based security is implemented on a 
connection basis so that detailed security rules are specifically 
defined for each connection to the device.  
 
Index Terms--Computer networks, Computer network 
management, Computer network security, Power system 
communication, Power system security, Protocols, Security. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
YBER-SECURITY is implemented for Distributed 
Network Protocol (DNP3) over Transport Layer Protocol 
/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) using DNP3 function codes and 
object headers from the application layer and the data-link 
layer at the interface between DNP3 and TCP/IP. Rule-base 
security is used to implement the cyber-security for incoming 
and outgoing data transmissions to a device. This DNP3 
cyber-security is used to augment commercial firewall 
appliances that have not been designed specifically for DNP3 
data communications. The DNP3 security in this paper 
therefore provides security coverage that commercial firewalls 
are unable to provide. 
Ongoing power system automation is increasing the amount 
of computer network traffic in the power system, due to 
device replacement with electronic networked devices or 
introducing new devices such as smart-meters within the 
distribution system. As a consequence of increased computer 
network traffic, cyber-attackers have more opportunities to 
affect the power system utility operations through various 
cyber-attacks, i.e. data manipulation, manufacturing data, or 
denial-of-service attacks, which can be used to cause wide-
area blackouts. For example, an advanced smart-meter may 
include a power cut-off safety switch to de-energize a 
premise, which can be used by a cyber-attacker to shutdown 
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the distribution system for large residential areas. Security for 
DNP3 is critically required to prevent occurrences of such 
attacks.  
Previously utility computer networks, such as those using 
DNP3, were not as vulnerable to security threats since only 
minimal numbers of trained utility staff had access to the 
computer networks. However, open-access under government 
imposed deregulation is increasing the utility computer 
network cyber-vulnerabilities due to more exposure to 
external networks. The increased exposure provides cyber-
attackers with easier access into utility computer networks, 
such as from the corporate networks and Internet, as well as 
more locations from which to access power system devices. 
For example with distribution system smart-meters, device 
access will include the distribution system owner, the 
electricity retailer, premise owner, and possibly government 
regulatory organizations and the device manufacturer. As a 
consequence, there are not only more devices and data that 
can be affected from a cyber-attack, but more access to the 
utility network to facilitate the attacks. 
With DNP3’s capability to interface with TCP/IP [1], 
DNP3 has increased cyber-security vulnerabilities.  Cyber-
attackers are capable of using commonly exploited Internet 
vulnerabilities to attack DNP3 devices, critically requiring 
cyber-security be adopted for DNP3. Currently, DNP3 
security requires the use of the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) or Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) when used over 
TCP/IP [1]-[4], which may also be in addition to commercial 
firewall appliances. The TLS, IPSec, and commercial 
firewalls provide security for DNP3 over TCP/IP, such as 
confidentiality and authentication, but since they are designed 
for general commercial application they do not provide 
security designed specifically for DNP3, limiting their 
effectiveness for DNP3. For example, a commercial-off-the-
shelf firewall appliance would not be capable of examining a 
received data-link link frame to detect and prevent an 
outstation from receiving a stop application command. In 
addition, TLS authentication would not be capable of 
preventing an outstation from receiving illegitimate control 
commands from a compromised master since the data would 
have been properly authenticated by the master.    
The proposed cyber-security for DNP3 over TCP/IP is used 
to augment commercial security implementations, providing 
security specific to DNP3 and utility computer networks. The 
cyber-security is used to detect and block data transmissions 
that do not conform to the allowed DNP3 function code and 
object header usage for a device on a connection basis with 
multiple masters or outstations. The DNP3 function codes and 
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object headers rigorously define the data exchanged between 
devices, providing the capability to apply rule-based security 
to control which data can be accessed or transmitted for a 
device. The rule-based security allows both wide and narrow 
scope security rules to be implemented using DNP3 data-link 
layer function codes [5], DNP3 application layer function 
codes [6], DNP3 application layer data object types [6]-[7], 
and data sets [8]. The cyber-security limits the effectiveness 
of cyber-attacks due to manipulated data, data from 
compromised sources, and manufactured data. An extensive 
list of cyber-threats against power system utilities can be 
found in [9]. 
In Section II, the DNP3 characteristics used for the cyber-
security proposed in this paper for DNP3 is discussed. Section 
III discusses the cyber-security operations. Section IV 
provides an example for the cyber-security and Section V 
provides the conclusion. 
II.  DNP3 CHARACTERISTICS USED FOR THE CYBER-SECURITY 
A.  TCP/IP Interface 
The DNP3 TCP/IP interface is located between the DNP3 
data-link layer and the TCP layer, which provides various 
configuration options for a DNP3 device [1]. With DNP3 over 
TCP/IP, multiple logical devices can be defined for a single 
physical DNP3 device using different IP addresses [1]. As a 
consequence, security rules can be defined for the physical 
device or for the individual logical devices. In addition, it is 
simpler to implement multiple remote masters for an 
outstation using TCP/IP since the underlying network 
becomes abstract to the devices. The use of multiple devices 
and multiple masters for an outstation increases the number of 
connections that security rules have to be implemented for.  
The cyber-security operations are not concerned with 
authentication or confidentiality since TLS or IPsec are used 
for the connection security. The cyber-security therefore 
assumes that the connection is legitimate and is only 
concerned with the DNP3 data. Although the connection may 
be legitimate to TLS or IPsec, the source device may have 
been compromised by a cyber-attacker allowing the cyber-
attacker to manipulate the destination device if the cyber-
security proposed in this paper is not used. For example 
without the cyber-security proposed in this paper, a master 
which typically only accesses monitoring data may be 
compromised to transmit control commands, altering the 
outstation’s operations.  
Unlike the cyber-security proposed in [10] which operates 
on the DNP3 data prior to fragmentation by the transport 
layer, the cyber-security proposed in this paper operates on 
the DNP3 data after fragmentation by the transport layer. In 
order for the cyber-security proposed in this paper to have the 
same degree of access to application layer fragments as was 
done in [10], the cyber-security would have to replicate much 
of the DNP3 protocol layer operations. For example, the 
cyber-security would have to remove the data-link layer 
Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRCs), reassemble all of the 
transport layer fragments, and parse the application layer 
message fragment. Replicating the DNP3 protocol layer 
functionality would therefore result in an inefficient cyber-
security design. In order to avoid the extraneous functionality 
of replicating the DNP3 protocol layer operations, the cyber-
security places restrictions on the application layer without 
requiring alterations to the DNP3 specification. The cyber-
security simply requires that each application layer message 
fragment contain only one object header. The cyber-security 
will therefore only have to examine the first data-link layer 
frame of the application layer fragment to obtain the function 
codes and the data object header. Within the data-link layer 
frame, the cyber-security also only has to examine the first 
user data block. Although this requirement may increase the 
number of data transmissions required to transmit the 
application data, the higher TCP/IP network speed may be 
able to compensate for the increased number of data 
transmissions. 
B.  Data-Link Layer 
The cyber-security uses the following data-link layer header 
information to implement the security rules: 
• Function code 
• Source address 
• Destination address 
The data-link layer function code can be used to indicate 
link status information between devices and to pass link 
commands, such as reset link [5]. As a consequence, a cyber-
attacker can alter the function code value for attacks in 
expectation of exposing vulnerabilities that may not have been 
handled by the device programmer, i.e. trying different header 
combinations to cause state errors. The cyber-security 
therefore must ensure that only valid function codes are used 
with a device. 
Security for the DNP3 network addresses is not handled by 
the lower layer security, such as TLS or IPsec, since the 
DNP3 addresses appear as user data to TCP/IP. Therefore, a 
cyber-attacker could manipulate the DNP3 addresses and not 
be detected by TLS or IPsec if the data transmission was from 
a legitimate but compromised device. As a consequence, an 
attacker could masquerade as another device if the cyber-
security is not used to confirm that the source IP address 
matches the source DNP3 address pairing. 
The destination address has special addressing modes for 
all-broadcast and self-testing [5]. These can be used to cause 
a cyber-attacker’s data to be transmitted to all possible 
destinations or for the DNP3 device to enter a testing mode 
creating a denial-of-service attack. The cyber-security 
therefore must be able to block data transmissions using the 
special addressing modes. 
C.  Application Layer Security 
The cyber-security proposed for DNP3 use the following 
information at the start of an application layer message 
fragment for implementing the security rules: 
• Function code 
• Object type (object group number and variation) 
• Qualifier 
• Object data (indexes and data sets) 
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Application layer function codes are used to indicate 
commands and requests to an outstation from a master and 
responses from an outstation to a master [6]. Since application 
layer function codes can be used to start, stop, or reconfigure 
a device they are a useful means to attack DNP3 devices that 
must be handled by the cyber-security. However, the security 
rules for the function codes may encompass too large of a 
scope for defining data transmission security rules. For 
example with a write command a master may be allowed to 
write to a certain point type but not to another point type, i.e. 
binary output and analog output. Therefore, the object header 
and data filled objects must be used to define finer security 
rules that the more encompassing function code security rules 
cannot handle.  
The object type defines the type of data being used with the 
function code, such as writing or reading analog or binary 
values, altering device or application configurations, and 
accessing or altering data sets [6]-[8]. Using the object types, 
an attacker can control how a device operates, such as 
changing the binary output point type for turning on or off 
relays or altering the device attributes. However, the object 
type security rules may also encompass too large of a scope 
for the data transmission security rules and may require 
refinement based on the qualifier field point type index values 
and the data set indexes. For example, a master may be 
allowed to control only specific relays defined by different 
binary output point type indexes. However, without security 
rules defining which point type indexes are allowed to be 
manipulated by the master, a master could use the qualifier 
field value of 0x06 to control all of the relays in the DNP3 
device. 
Security rules for data sets are critical with their capability 
to use function codes within the data set, such as select and 
operate for the binary output point type [8]. Without security-
rules for the data sets, a cyber-attacker could bypass the 
function code security rules and access or alter data directly 
through the data sets.  
III.  CYBER-SECURITY OPERATIONS 
A.  Cyber-Security States 
The cyber-security has three states, shown in Fig. 1, which 
are: idle, frame security, and data security. The cyber-security 
is in the idle state when there are no data transmissions to 
process. The frame security state is used to process the data-
link layer header data and the data security state is used to 
process the user data from the application layer. 
Idle
Finished
No frames
if FIR = 1
(transport layer header)
Frame
Security
Data
Security
Received
frame
Finished
 
Fig. 1. Cyber-security states. 
The idle state transitions to the frame security state for 
every data transmission that is received from either the TCP 
layer or the DNP3 data-link layer. The security rules for the 
data-link layer are applied, and if the frame does not conform 
to the rules, it is discarded. If the frame conforms to the rules, 
and it is the start of a new application layer message fragment 
as determined from the transport layer FIR bit [11], the cyber-
security transitions to the data security state. Once the cyber-
security finishes processing the frame and possibly the user 
data, it transitions into the idle state. If any data transmission 
does not conform to the allowed function code or data object 
usage, it is discarded by the cyber-security. 
B.  Frame Security State 
For DNP3 over TCP/IP the types of function codes that can 
be used for a data transmission is limited [5]. The confirmed 
user data function code, and hence the NACK and ACK 
function codes, are not used for this configuration. Therefore, 
the cyber-security can implement simplified look-up tables for 
the security rather than implementing security rules that are 
used for the data security state. Basically only the 
unconfirmed user data, link status request, and link status 
function codes are needed to be defined for the cyber-security 
and therefore only a limited number of control field values, 
which includes the function code, need to be listed in the 
look-up table. The allowed control field values by the cyber 
security are shown in Table I. If a data transmission does 
contain one of these values, it is discarded by the cyber-
security. 
TABLE I 
ALLOWED DATA-LINK LAYER CONTROL FIELD VALUES 
Function Code Primary Master Control Field 
 0xC4 
Unconfirmed user data  
 0x44 
 0xC9 
Request link status  
 0x49 
 0x8B 
Link status  
 0x0B 
 
In Table I, the function code column lists the allowed 
function codes, the primary column indicates if the function 
code is from a primary station or a secondary station, the 
master column indicates if the data transmission is from a 
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master or an outstation, and the control field column lists the 
allowed values for the control field. 
For incoming data transmissions to the DNP3 device, the 
cyber-security uses a look-up table to match the source IP 
address with the DNP3 source address. The cyber-security 
also confirms that the DNP3 destination address is less than 
0XFFF0, which is the start of the special address mode 
address range. No security is applied to the address fields for 
the data transmissions from the device since the TCP/IP 
interface will provide the operations for controlling outgoing 
data transmissions, i.e. looking-up the destination IP address 
paired with the DNP3 destination address. 
C.  Data Security State 
Since the IP addresses can used to create multiple logical 
devices within a single physical device, the number of security 
rules used for the data security state have to be minimized in 
order to increase efficiency. The cyber-security therefore 
discards any data transmissions that do not have a matching 
security rule. Function codes, object headers, and data have to 
have explicit rules defined for each connection in order to be 
allowed by the cyber-security. The data security state security 
rules are applied four stages: function code, object type, 
qualifier field, and data sets. A data transmission is discarded 
if it does not conform to the usage rules. 
    1)  Function Codes   
The security rules for the function codes define 
encompassing rules for data transmissions that allow them to 
be discarded or passed on to either the DNP3 data-link layer 
or TCP layer with minimal processing. The security rules for 
the function codes use the following parameters: source IP 
address, destination IP address, rule applicability, function 
code, unconditional permission, and object type link. 
Source IP address: provides the IP addresses of the logical 
devices within the single physical device. This parameter is 
unnecessary for DNP3 devices that have a single logical 
device. 
Destination IP address: provides the IP address of the 
connecting device. This value represents the source IP 
address for data transmissions incoming to the DNP3 device 
and the destination IP address for data transmissions outgoing 
from the DNP3 device.  
Rule applicability: indicates if the security rule is to be 
applied to data transmissions leaving the DNP3 device or 
being received by the DNP3 device for a specific connection 
defined by the destination IP address parameter.  
Function code: provides the allowed function code values for 
the connection between the DNP3 devices and for a particular 
data transmission direction. 
Unconditional permission: provides the scope of the function 
code security rule. If unconditional permission is given, all 
data transmissions using the function code are allowed 
regardless of the object header or the data. Otherwise, the 
cyber-security has to proceed to the next stage of security 
rules dealing with the object type. 
Object type link: provides a reference link to the security rules 
used for the object type if the unconditional permission 
parameter is not set. The object type link provides a unique 
reference to the object types for each function code allowing a 
finer security rule scope. However, some function codes may 
share the same object type security rules and therefore have 
the same object type link parameter. For example with an 
outstation, the read function code security rules may have the 
same object type link parameter as the response and 
unsolicited response function codes security rules. 
The cyber-security will search the function code security 
rules for a matching entry for the received data or data that is 
being transmitted for a particular connection and direction. If 
no matching entry is located, the data transmission is 
discarded. If an entry is found and the unconditional 
permission parameter is set, the data transmission is allowed 
and the data security set transitions back to the idle state. If an 
entry is located and the unconditional permission parameter is 
not set, the cyber-security proceeds to the object type security 
rules. 
    2)  Object Type 
The security rules for the object types define encompassing 
rules for object headers and the data filled objects that allow 
them to be discarded or passed on to either the DNP3 data-
link layer or TCP layer with minimal processing. The object 
type field in an application layer object header is composed of 
both the object group and the variation values. The object 
group indicates the type of the data, i.e. binary and analog 
input and output values, time values, and file operations [6]. 
The variation represents the data type used for the object data, 
such as floating point, integer, and flags [6]. The security 
rules for the object type use the following parameters: object 
type link, object group, unconditional permission, 
unconditional variation permission, variation list, 
unconditional index permission, and index list. The last two 
parameters are used for the qualifier field and data set security 
rules that are dealt with in following subsections. 
Object type link: provides the reference link from the function 
code security rules to the object type security rules. The same 
object type security rule may be referenced from multiple 
function code security rules.  
Object group: provides the allowed object group values for a 
particular connection, function code, and transmission 
direction. 
Unconditional permission: provides the scope of the object 
type security rule. If unconditional permission is given, all 
data transmissions using the object group are allowed 
regardless of the variant, qualifier field, and data sets. 
Otherwise, the cyber-security proceeds to the security rules 
dealing with the variant values. 
Unconditional variant permission: indicates if security rules 
are applied to the object type variant values. If unconditional 
permission is given, there are no restrictions on the variant. 
Otherwise, the variant value for the data transmission must be 
located in the variant list parameter. 
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Variant list: contains a listing of allowed variant values for the 
object group for a particular connection, function code, and 
data transmission direction. 
The cyber-security will search the object type security rules 
for a matching object group entry and object type link for a 
particular connection. If no matching entry is located, the data 
transmission is discarded. If an entry is found and the 
unconditional permission parameter is set, the data 
transmission is allowed and the data security set transitions 
back to the idle state. If an entry is located and the 
unconditional permission parameter is not set, the cyber-
security examines the unconditional variant permission 
parameter. If this parameter is not set, the variant list is 
examined for a matching variant value. If the matching variant 
value is not located the data transmission is discarded. 
Otherwise, the cyber-security goes to the qualifier field 
security rules if the object group is not a data set or the data 
set security rules if the object group is a data set. 
    3)  Qualifier Field 
The qualifier field defines how the data is organized in the 
data-filled object, i.e. whether the data is packed by indexes or 
by object size [6]. Although security rules can be created for 
the qualifier field values, the cyber-security assumes that only 
the recommended qualifier field values [6] are allowed by the 
application layer in order to simplify the application of the 
security rules and increase the efficiency of the cyber-
security. Associated with the qualifier field are the point type 
arrays, which is an index of data points for a particular point 
type such as one analog input point for each phase voltage. 
Security rules are critical for the qualifier field in allowing 
which point type indexes are allowed to be accessed. Without 
security rules for the qualifier field a cyber-attacker would be 
able to access any index for a particular point type. For 
example, a compromised master would be able to alter all of 
the binary output data points instead of the binary output data 
point that it should only be allowed to access. The qualifier 
field security rules use following parameters from the object 
type security rule parameters: unconditional index permission 
and index list. 
Unconditional index permission: indicates if there are any 
restrictions on which index values for the point type are 
allowed for the connection. If unconditional permission is 
given, there are no restrictions on the indexes. Otherwise, the 
cyber-security determines which index points are allowed for 
the data transmission using the index list parameter. 
Index list: contains a listing of allowed data points for the 
object group for a particular connection, function code, and 
data transmission direction. 
The qualifier field security rules will discard a data 
transmission if the unconditional index permission is not set 
and the index value for the data point is not located within the 
index list parameter, i.e. if the qualifier field has a value of 
0x06 for all data points. The unconditional index permission 
parameter is unlikely to be set in most cases since if 
unconditional permission cannot be granted for an object 
type, there will be restrictions on which data points that can 
be accessed, such as preventing a device from altering relay 
block values in the binary output object group (g12v3). The 
cyber-security will transition back to the idle state after this 
data security state stage. 
    4)  Data Sets 
Data sets provide the means to group related data, but 
possibly in unrelated point types, together. Since the data sets 
can contain various combinations of point types and points 
within a specific point type and use function codes, data sets 
can be used to bypass the security rules implemented for the 
function codes, object types, and qualifier fields. Therefore, 
cyber-security rules are necessary to control the use of data 
sets from being transmitted and received by a device. For 
example if security rules were not used for data sets, a master 
that was blocked from using select and operate function codes 
may bypass this security if an outstation data set contained the 
select and operate function codes. The data set security rules 
use following parameters from the object type security rule 
parameters: unconditional index permission and index list. 
These are the same parameters that are used by the qualifier 
field security rules. The cyber-security can distinguish if these 
parameters are to be used for the data sets by the object group 
numbers that are used for the data sets (groups 85 through 
87). 
Unconditional index permission: indicates if there are any 
restrictions on which data sets are allowed for the connection. 
If unconditional permission is given, there are no restrictions 
on the data sets. Otherwise, the cyber-security determines 
which data sets are allowed for the data transmission using the 
index list parameter. 
Index list: contains a listing of allowed data sets for a 
particular connection, function code, and data transmission 
direction. 
The data set security rules will discard a data transmission 
if the unconditional index permission is not set and the index 
value for the data set is not located within the index list 
parameter. The unconditional index permission parameter is 
unlikely to be set since data sets can be varied by an 
outstation after reset for both ordering, structure, and number 
of supported data sets. The cyber-security will transition back 
to the idle state after this data security state stage. 
IV.  SECURITY EXAMPLE 
A.  Overview 
An example is presented for illustrating the application of 
the cyber-security proposed in this paper for the distribution 
system using a residential property. The residential property 
has a smart-meter, dispersed generation such as solar or wind, 
and an electricity storage device such as fuel cells for 
uninterruptible power supply (UPS) and electricity back-up 
operations. The smart-meter, generator, and electricity storage 
device are part of a single logical DNP3 device that is 
connected into the Internet shown in Fig. 2. 
The DNP3 device has Internet connections to the 
distribution system owner, the electricity retailer, and the 
residential consumer shown in Fig. 2. The example assumes 
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that the security dealing with the Internet connections are 
dealt with by either the TCP interface or the TLS. 
Smart-meter
interface
Electricity storage
interface
Dispersed generation
interface
DNP3 device
Internet
Distribution Retailer Residential Consumer
 
Fig. 3. Cyber-security example of a single DNP3 outstation device with multiple 
masters. 
The distribution system owner in this example requires full 
access to all of the DNP3 device’s point types and data points 
to ensure reliable distribution system operation, for control, 
protection and monitoring operations.  
The electricity retailer is an independent company from the 
distribution system owner that purchases bulk electricity from 
generation companies and sells the electricity to residential 
consumers. The electricity retailer therefore requires access to 
the residential consumer’s consumption records for billing 
purposes. 
The residential consumer requires access to the device for 
monitoring their electricity consumption, which allows them 
to control their electricity usage and minimize their electricity 
costs. The residential consumer also requires control over the 
DNP3 device. For example, the residential consumer can 
decide how much of their generation capacity to sell to the 
distribution system owner from both the dispersed generation 
and the electricity storage device dependent on the current 
electricity rates, their current consumption, and their current 
capacity. 
B.  Device Point Types and Data Points 
The cyber-security example is simplified by considering 
only a few point types and data points. In addition, the cyber-
security example is simplified by not including security rules 
for the object type variations. The point types used in this 
example are binary output, counter, analog input, analog 
output, and data set [6]-[8]. 
Binary Output:  
Index 0 is used to disconnect the home entirely from the 
distribution system although the dispersed generation and the 
electricity storage will still be operational within the home.  
Index 1 is a master override to disconnect the dispersed 
generation from the electricity system within the home and 
the distribution system.  
Index 2 is a master override to disconnect the electricity 
storage from the electricity system within the home and the 
distribution system.  
Index 3 is a local override to disconnect the dispersed 
generation from the electricity system within the home and 
the distribution system for maintenance.  
Index 4 is a local override to disconnect the electricity 
storage from the electricity system within the home and the 
distribution system for maintenance.  
Index 5 is used to initiate device diagnostics for 
troubleshooting and maintenance. 
Counter: 
Indexes 0 through 2 are used to provide the power 
consumption information (KWh for current price rate, KWh 
for current day, and KWh from last billing date) to the 
distribution system owner, the electricity retailer, and the 
residential consumer. These indexes provide all of the parties 
with billing parameters to the residential consumer and the 
electricity retailer.  
Indexes 3 through 5 provide power generation billing 
information (KWh for current price rate, KWh for current 
day, and KWh from last billing date) to the distribution 
system from the residential consumer. 
Analog Input: 
Index 0 is used to monitor the power consumption from the 
distribution system.  
Index 1 monitors the total power generation by the 
residential consumer into the distribution system.  
Index 2 is the total power generation of the dispersed 
generation.  
Index 3 is the total power being generated or stored by the 
electricity storage device.  
Index 4 is the current power generation capacity of the 
electrical storage device to allow the residential consumer to 
determine if they should store or generate electricity for the 
electricity storage device. 
Analog Output: 
Index 0 is used by the residential consumer to control how 
much electricity the electricity storage device is allowed to 
generate for selling to the distribution system.  
Index 1 indicates the current electricity rate for purchasing 
electricity in the free-market.  
Index 2 indicates the current electricity rate for the 
residential consumer to sell electricity to the distribution 
system.  
Index 3 indicates the current contractual electricity rate for 
the residential consumer to purchase the electricity from the 
electricity retailer. 
Data Sets: 
Index 0 is used to provide all of the current KWh counter 
values while index 1 provides all of the current power 
readings from the analog input point type. 
C.  Security Rules 
Since the example is simplified by omitting security for the 
variation, the unconditional permission (U.P.) for the group 
object is equivalent to the unconditional index permission. 
    1)  Distribution System Owner 
Since the distribution system owner requires full access to 
the DNP3 device, there are no restrictions on device access. 
Therefore, all of the function codes have unconditional 
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permission. Since all of the function codes have unconditional 
permission, there are no security rules for the data objects. 
    2)  Electricity Retailer 
The electricity retailer requires information for billing 
purposes and therefore does not need access to as much data 
from the DNP3 device. For data transmissions received by the 
device, the security rules will allow the following function 
codes: confirm, read, and write. For data transmissions 
transmitted by the device, the security rules will allow the 
following function codes: response and unsolicited response. 
Only the confirm function code has unconditional permission 
with the rest of the function codes requiring object type 
security rules. 
For the read function code, the electricity retailer will 
require access to the binary output point type to determine the 
home’s connection status to the distribution system. The 
electricity retailer will require access to the counter point type 
to determine electricity billing for the residential consumer. 
Access to the analog input point type is used to monitor the 
power consumption by the residential consumer, which 
requires access to all of indexes for each of the analog input 
group objects except the deadband. The electricity retailer 
also requires access to the analog output point type for 
monitoring the electricity rates, i.e. determining when the 
distribution system owner has increased penalties on the 
residential consumer not conserving electricity. The electricity 
retailer is not allowed to access any of the data sets since they 
contain information that the retailer does not need to access.  
For the read function code, the security rules for the object 
groups are listed in Table II.  
TABLE II 
ELECTRICITY RETAILER READ FUNCTION CODE SECURITY RULES 
Point Object Type Group U.P. Index List 
Present Value 10 N 0 Binary 
Output Report Changes 11 N 0 
Present Value 20 N 0, 1, 2 
Frozen Value 21 N 0, 1, 2 
Event Value 22 N 0 Counter 
Frozen Event 
Value 23 N 0 
Present Value 30 N 0 
Frozen Value 31 N 0 
Event Value 32 N 0 Analog Input 
Frozen Event 
Value 33 N 0 
Present Value 40 N 1, 3 Analog 
Output Report Changes 42 N 1, 3 
For the write function code, shown in Table III, the 
electricity retailer requires the capability alter the residential 
consumer’s pricing information. 
TABLE III 
ELECTRICITY RETAILER WRITE FUNCTION CODE SECURITY RULES 
Point Object Object U.P. Index List 
Analog 
Output Alter Value 41 N 3 
 
The response and unsolicited response function codes have 
the same group object rules as the read function code since 
the device will only respond with the same indexes that were 
allowed for the read requests. 
    3)  Residential Consumer 
The residential consumer requires information for billing 
purposes and device operations, including the capability to 
shut down the device. For data transmissions received by the 
device, the security rules will allow the following function 
codes: confirm, read, and write, select, operate, direct operate, 
and direct operate no response. For data transmissions 
transmitted by the device, the security rules will allow the 
following function codes: response and unsolicited response. 
Only the confirm function code has unconditional permission 
with the rest of the function codes requiring object type 
security rules. 
For the read function code, the residential consumer will 
require access to the binary output point type to determine the 
status of the device. The residential consumer also requires all 
data regarding the electricity rates in order to make decisions 
regarding their generation capacity, i.e. whether to sell or 
store electricity. The analog input point type is used to 
monitor consumption and generation for the home, requiring 
access to all data points except for some indexes dealing with 
deadbands that are used by the distribution system owner. The 
residential consumer also requires full access to all electricity 
rate information in the analog output point type and the data 
sets.  For the read function code, the security rules for the 
object groups are listed in Table IV.  
TABLE IV 
RESIDENTIAL CONSUMER READ FUNCTION CODE SECURITY RULES 
Point Object Object U.P. Index List 
Present Value 10 Y - Binary 
Output Report Changes 11 Y - 
Present Value 20 Y - 
Frozen Value 21 Y - 
Event Value 22 Y - Counter 
Frozen Event 
Value 23 Y - 
Present Value 30 Y - 
Frozen Value 31 Y - 
Event Value 32 Y - 
Frozen Event 
Value 33 Y - 
Analog 
Input 
Deadband 34 N 2, 3, 4 
Present Value 40 Y - Analog 
Output Report Changes 42 Y - 
Static 87 Y - Data Set 
Event 88 Y - 
 
For the write function code, the residential consumer will 
require access to the analog input deadband values for 
controlling events for the dispersed generation and the 
electricity storage devices. In addition, the residential 
consumer must be able to control the electricity storage 
device using the output analog point type.  For the write 
function code, the security rules for the object groups are 
listed in Table V. 
TABLE V 
RESIDENTIAL CONSUMER WRITE FUNCTION CODE SECURITY RULES 
 
Point Object Type Group U.P. Index List 
Analog 
Input Deadbands 34 N 2, 3, 4 
Analog 
Output Altering Value 41 N 0 
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For the select/operate group of function codes, the 
residential consumer will require access to the binary output 
point type to control the operations of the DNP3 device such 
as shutting down the dispersed generation, the electricity 
storage, and disconnecting the home from the distribution 
system for maintenance.  For the select/operate group of 
function codes, the security rules for the object groups are 
listed in Table VI. 
TABLE VI 
RESIDENTIAL CONSUMER SELECT/OPERATE FUNCTION CODES SECURITY 
RULES 
Point Object Object  U.P. Index List 
Binary 
Output Altering 12 N 3, 4 
The response and unsolicited response function codes have 
the same group object rules as the read function code. If the 
electricity retailer is allowed to read the index for a particular 
object, then the device must be able to transmit the data for 
those points. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
   The cyber-vulnerabilities of utility computer networks are 
increasing due to more network-capable devices arising from 
utility automaton and open-access under government imposed 
deregulation. Cyber-vulnerability is increased since the 
networked devices are exposed to external networks, such as 
from corporate computer networks, and from unsecured sites, 
such as smart-meters within residential premises. This paper 
has proposed a new cyber-security for DNP3 over TCP/IP to 
augment commercial security implementations, providing 
security specific to DNP3 and utility computer networks. 
   The proposed cyber-security uses the function codes, object 
type (object group and variation), qualifier field and data 
point index values and data sets from the DNP3 data-link 
layer and application layer headers to implement security 
rules for the data transmissions which are not handled by 
TLS, IPsec, or firewall appliances. The cyber-security ensures 
that a device can only receive or transmit data that is allowed 
for a particular connection to a master or outstation. The 
cyber-security prevents a compromised master from being 
capable of transmitting control data to a device when it should 
only be allowed to access monitoring data. Security rules are 
used to implement the cyber-security for both incoming and 
outgoing data transmissions to a device. The security rules 
provide both coarse and fine rules so that the coarse rules 
minimize the number of rules that need to be implemented 
increasing efficiency while the fine rules allow precise 
application of the security to data transmissions. Coarse rules 
are defined through the function codes while fine rules are 
defined through the object type, qualifier field, and the data 
sets such as ensuring that only analog input values are read 
for the monitoring data rather than the binary output values 
used for device operations.  
 With the proposed cyber-security potential threats from 
cyber-attackers manipulating or manufacturing data are 
minimized, such as altering configuration settings to disrupt 
the power system through wide-area blackouts. 
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